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A Critique of a Custom in Labor Economics 
E k k e h a r t Sch l i cht* 
A b s t r a c t : A n explanation of significant involuntary unemployment requires an un-
derstanding of why firms behave as non-util ity takers (NUT's). Such an explanation, i t 
is argued, seems to be hard to obtain i n a plausible way under the customary assump-
tion that workers maximize a ut i l i ty function involving only income and effort. If, how-
ever, slightly less crude motivational assumptions are introduced, this might lead to 
rather straightforward understanding of N U T behavior and, consequently, of involun-
tary unemployment. 
1. In t roduct i on 
It is customary i n labor market theory to view the worker as maximizing a ut i l i ty 
function u (y, e) in income y and effort e (where both might be vectors, even random 
vectors) under the constraints which he faces. These constraints involve the form of the 
employment contract which establishes a (possibly stochastic) relationship between 
income and effort y = y (e). The worker's action can be influenced by changing the 
constraint y (.) along with the employment contract, since the worker chooses his effort 
e such as to maximize u (y (e), e). The firm is supposed to select - out of self-interest or 
under the discipline of competition - that employment contract which maximizes profit. 
I shall argue i n this paper that we should eradicate this custom of assuming that the 
worker maximizes a given ut i l i ty function involving only income and effort. 
If we maintain (as I shall do throughout) that the firms choose contracts which are 
profit-maximizing, the custom leads to unrealistic consequences. The most important 
of these is that involuntary unemployment can never occur. Further, psychological 
research indicates that the custom is at variance with many observations on human 
motivation. A l l this suggests to me that the custom gives the wrong framing for our 
questions and answers also i n those cases where it seems to work , and even this might 
warrant explanation in itself. 
If we drop the custom, however, i n favor of more realistic behavioral assumptions, 
many theoretical problems with the theory of unemployment disappear, and we might 
hope to gain a fresh perspecitive for labor market problems, in general. 
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2. A C r i t i c i s m of the C u s t o m 
2.1 The Focus of the C r i t i q u e 
If we start analyizing a labor market problem by assuming that the worker maximizes 
a ut i l i ty function u (y, e), this involves several factual assumptions, which a l l come 
down to the assertion that u (y, e) can be assumed to remain constant for the period 
under analysis 1 ]: In so far as other factors influence ut i l i ty , these should not vary 
during the period of analysis such that we can sensibly fix them under a ceteris paribus 
clause. This entails, i n particular, the assumption that ut i l i ty is not influenced by the 
processes under analysis through other channels than those explicitely mentioned, i.e. 
income and effort. In other words, the constraint y (.) is not an argument i n the uti l i ty 
function. This excludes e.g. that the workers' u t i l i t y and mot ivat ion might be 
significantly affected by the way i n which they receive their income (whether as a 
piece-rate or time-rate, for instance), but this is excluded by the custom, and I shall 
argue later on that this has detrimental consequences. 
In attacking the custom, I do not oppose to its use i n analyzing specific narrowly 
defined problems which involve no change i n contractual relations or other additional 
variables which might influence motivation. Rather it is its use i n explaining the 
choice of labor contracts which I oppose, since these choices seem to affect motivation 
significantly through other channels than income. 
2.2 N o n - U t i l i t y - T a k i n g 
If firms behave as utl i ty takers i n h ir ing , they w i l l offer contracts which leave the 
workers practically indifferent between employment and unemployment. This ex-
cludes the possibility of involuntary unemployment. 2 ) 
Involuntary unemployment requires, hence, that the firms behave as non-ut i l i ty-
takers i n h ir ing new workers, or as N U T s , for short. 3 ) 
It has been argued that this non-uti l ity-taking might occur for several reasons: 
1. B y offering higher wages, firms might restrict turnover and reduce, hence, turn-
over costs (Salop (1973,1979), Schlicht (1978), Lindbeck/Snower (1984)). 
2. B y offering higher wages, firms might make it possible to use the threat of dis-
missal as a discipline device (Shapiro/Stiglitz (1984), Stoft (1982)). 
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3. B y offering higher wages, firms might get, through a self-selection process, better 
workers (Weiss (1980)). 
4. B y offering higher wages, firms might induce the workers to work harder through 
a morale effect (Akerlof (1982), Solow (1979)). 
2.3. A C r i t i c i s m of N o n - U t i l i t y T a k i n g under the C u s t o m 
A l l these, and possible other reasons, make it worthwhile for firms to behave as N U T s , 
but a l l of them seem conceptually inconsistent wi th the custom of assuming the 
workers to maximize u (y, e). This has been remarked by different writers in different 
contexts but i t seems impossible to prove this assertion i n the form of a theorem since 
its assumptions remain unspecified. Let me indicate briefly, however, the nature of the 
arguments which lead me to this conclusion. 4* 
1. Turnover. In the turnover case, the firm can offer a contract which involves, in one 
way or another, that workers pay a certain sum of money to an outside agency in case 
they want to change the firm, and the firms might reduce their wage level such that 
they just get a sufficient number of applicants, given the bonding. Alternatively they 
might simply require the workers to create and document sufficient immobility as long 
as they pay more than the reservation wage. This permits them to reduce the wage 
unt i l the contracts offered are ut i l i ty - tak ing . 5 ) 
2. Discipline. In the discipline case, firms might replace the threat of dismissal by 
another threat (e.g. a fine payable to an outside agency) which is considered as 
equivalent by the workers and is conditioned on the same signal as sacking has been. 
This would render it unnecessary again to pay more than ut i l i ty - taking wages: Wages 
would simply exceed the reservation wage by that amount which would compensate for 
the disuti l i ty of a fine, but there would be no reason for the firm to pay more, and 
workers would remain indifferent between accepting and rejecting the job. 6 ) 
3. Self-Selection. In the self-selection case i t remains unclear why the better workers 
have higher reservation wages and why it is not profitable to pretend being a good 
worker by simply selecting a high reservation wage. A n y story explaning this w i l l 
involve, however, that productivity differences turn out to be observable i n one way or 
another. This makes i t possible to condition contracts on that signal , and it is in the 
interest of the better workers or the firm to do so. 
Take e.g. the case that the better workers face a smaller chance of dismissal or better 
promotion prospects which makes it worthwhile for them to search longer and put their 
reservation wage higher than is optimal for the less productive worker (Schlicht 
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(1986a)). Here it seems possible to discourage tne less productive ind iv iduals by 
conditioning fines or premia (or equivalents) on the same signals which previously led 
to dismissal or promotion.7* This would permit the firms to increase the quality of the 
applicants without the necessity to offer wages which more than offset the disuti l ity of 
the fines for the more productive workers. 8* 
4. Morale. If the morale case is interpreted according to the custom, i t reduces to a 
highly implausibe income effect:9* The uti l i ty function must be such that the workers 
simply l ike to work more i f they receive more income. In the original nutr i t ional 
efficiency wage model (Stiglitz (1976)), this seemed a plausible hypothesis, but with 
regard to modern labor markets the assumption seems strange indeed: S imply by 
selecting workers wi th other income sources, l ike inherited wealth or w o r k i n g 
husbands, firms could economize on wages without hurt ing productivity. 
Formally , the "income effect" interpretation is, however, clearly compatible with the 
custom i f no signals of effort are available. 
Take e.g. the ut i l i ty function u(y, e) = y - d (cy-e) 2 which leads to optimal effort e = cy. 
If c is large enough, a rise i n income w i l l induce an increase i n efficiency which is large 
enough to offset additional wage expenses. 
If this were true, we could expect involuntary unemployment i n occupations were no 
signal of effort is available at reasonable cost, but i n other occupations where a signal 
of effort is available, there arise some formal problems with obtaining N U T behaviour 
from the income effect. 
Take the simple case of one-dimensional effort and income and assume that a signal of 
effort e is available which permits the firm to either implement a l inear wage schedule 
(1) y = a + be 
or to fix an effort norm e n which gives the min imum effort required. 1 0* Consider the 
case of a wage schedule first. 
The worker maximizes 
(2) u(a + be,e) 
with respect to effort which yields his optimal effort response 
(3) e(a,b)= argmax u(a + be,e). 
e 
A Critique of a Custom in Labor Economics 159 
The associated first- and second-order conditions read: 
(4) u.b + u, = 0 
(5) A := b 2 u u + 2 b u 1 2 + u 2 2 < 0 
(6) 
(7) 
6 e 1 „ 
S = - ï * u l l + u 1 2) 
~ = - ^ ( u 1 + b e u 1 1 + e u 1 2 ) 
The firm maximizes its profits, that is, its value added f (e) minus wage payments 
a + be, by choosing a and b and taking the worker's response (3) into account. Assume 
that it is optimal for the firm to behave as a N U T . Then the ut i l i ty - taking constraint 
w i l l not be binding and (a,b) w i l l represent an inner maximum of 
(8) f ( e ( a , b ) ) - a - b e ( a , b ) . 
This implies the first-order conditions 
(Q) 6e 
w ( f - b ) — = 1 
ôa 
(10) 6 e 
( r - b ) ô T = e 
These conditions imply 
(ID Ôe ôe 
Ôa" ~ 6b 
which yields together with (6) and (7) the condition 
(12) U l = 0 
and, together with (4), also 
(13) u 2 = 0 
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which is hardly compatible wi th a reasonable interpretation of the custom: In 
equil ibrium, the highly singular case must obtain that both the marginal uti l i ty of 
income and of effort are zero! 1 1 } 
Alternatively, the firm might impose an effort norm e n which gives the minimum effort 
required, and offer a constant wage y. Here the worker would choose l 2 ) 
(14) e(y, en) = argmax u(y, e). 
The f irm maximizes 
(15) f (e (y ,e n ) ) -y 
but this time with respect to y and e n. If N U T behavior is profitable, (15) must have an 
inner maximum, say (y*, en*). Starting from this position, the effort norm can be made 
binding without hurt ing ut i l i ty or productivity and (y*, e (y*, en*)) gives maximum 
profits as well . B y lowering income below y* while maintaining the effort norm e (y*, 
en*), profits can be increased, since effort cannot be reduced below e (y*, en*). This can 
be repeated, and income w i l l be reduced unless a ut i l i ty taking constraint becomes 
binding, but this rules out N U T behavior. 
Akerlof (1982) avoided this result by assuming that a binding effort norm affects 
morale adversely, thus harms productivity and is not imposed. This implies that the 
effort norm enters the uti l i ty function, and i n this sense the custom is violated. 
A similar argument could be made with regard to our first example: Workers simply 
might dislike piece rates (b>0 i n (1)). If this aversion is sufficiently strong, this might 
enforce a pure time rate, and the income effect might work. (In the case of u(y, e) = 
y - d (cy-e) 2, c large, i t w i l l for example.) 
But the form of the employment contract (i.e. b i n the last example) must again be 
assumed to enter the ut i l i ty function through other channels than income and effort. 
This violates the custom and ultimately comes down to the assertion that employment 
contracts are what they are because people like these rather than other contracts - a 
position which cannot be disproved easily, but seems not to be very i l luminat ing either! 
In short, N U T behaviour and involuntary unemployment might occur i n models which 
are faithful to the custom only i f effort is not observable at reasonable cost. Since 
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involuntary unemployment seems to exist also i n occupations where effort actually is 
observable at rather low cost, N U T behaviour seems not to be restricted to, and is not 
always caused by, informational asymmetries. I doubt that we should conclude here 
that the custom is val id i n cases where effort is unobservable or ut i l i ty taking prevails, 
and void in other cases. I prefer to conclude that the custom is misleading altogether, 
and i f it seems to work in some cases, this might have happened by chance.1 3* 
3. The Theory of M o t i v a t i o n a n d L a b o r E c o n o m i c s 
3.1 The Cus tom as a n Insuff ic ient T h e o r y of M o t i v a t i o n 
According to the psychologist Solomon Asch (1952: 318), uti l i ty theory "is not so much 
a theory of motivation as an attempt to sidestep the need for one, " and this holds true 
also for the theoretical custom under discussion; its strenth rests i n its promise to 
render more detailed theories of human motivation redundant. 1 4* 
U p to now I have tried to argue that the custom makes it very hard to develop a useful 
theory of N U T s and, a fortiori, of involuntary unemployment. This suggests that either 
the custom is unrealistic, or involuntary unemployment does not exist. 
It seems to be empirically evident that workers are, as a rule, far from being indifferent 
between being unemployed and getting a job at the going wage rate. This implies that 
firms often behave as N U T s . On the other hand, the custom seems to be i n conflict with 
experiments and theories of motivation save under rather definite circumstances. 1 5* 
These two things together should render, I think, heretical views more palatable, even 
i f there seems to be no equally simplistic alternative to replace the custom. After a l l i t 
might be just inappropriate to economize i n labor market theory on motivational 
assumptions, since some steps towards realism i n the assumptions might render our 
theories much simpler in other respects. 
Since the present paper is devoted to a criticism of the custom, rather than to presen-
ting a better alternative, I shall only offer some very brief remarks on this possibility 
here.1 6* 
3.2 The Over just i f i cat ion P a r a d i g m a n d L a b o r Contracts 
I select the "overjustification paradigm" to illustrate that economists might profitably 
borrow from psychology, especially i n cases which contradict the economicsts model of 
man and, hence, the custom under discussion. 1 7* 
162 Ekkehart Schlicht 
The overjustification paradigm states that 'extrinsic motivation destroys intr ins ic 
motivation." Arkes/Garske (1982:334-335) characterize these experiments as follows: 
"Deci's early experiments a l l had similar formats. Each subject was asked to work on 
several three-dimensional block puzzles. The puzzles were interesting, and Deci pre-
sumed that this challenging task would have substantial intrinsic motivation. One-
third of the subjects were told before they began the task that they would be paid for 
each puzzle they completed (expected-money group). 
One-third of the subjects were told after they had worked the puzzles that they would 
be paid for each puzzle they had completed (unexpected-money group). One-third of the 
subjects were never offered money (no-money group). After the puzzle session, when 
the experiment was presumably over, the subjects were left alone to read magazines, 
work on some more puzzles, or do whatever they l iked. The experimenter left the room 
for several minutes while another experimenter unobtrusively observed the subjects. 
To the extent that subjects returned to the puzzles, they were said to be intrinsical ly 
motivated. Since they would receive no money for performance during this period and 
since they believed their performance was not even being monitored, any work on the 
puzzles would seem to be the result of intrinsic motivation. 
The subjects who had never been paid spent more time doing puzzles during this period 
than the expected-money group, and the unexpected-money group spent as much time 
doing puzzles during this final session as the no-money group. The attr ibut ional 
analysis of these results is straightforward. Subjects who expect payment attribute 
their performance to the cash. ( T m doing this because I'm being paid to.") After the 
experimenter pays the subject and leaves the room, there is no reason to return to the 
puzzle, since further payment is not expected. Whatever intrinsic interest the puzzles 
may have possessed in i t ia l ly , the attribution of performance to the money decreases 
intrinsic interest i n them. The very important point here is that extrinsic rewards may 
undermine intrinsic motivation. 
Deci's finding is predicted by Kelley's discounting principle, mentioned earlier. This 
principle states that a person w i l l discount the role of a particular cause i n producing 
an effect i f other possible causes are present. Deci's expected-money subjects have a 
very prominent cause to which they can attribute their behavior - the cash. Conse-
quently, they discount the role of intrinsic motivation. 
One might think that paying the unexpected-money subjects would decrease their 
intrinsic motivation to work on the puzzles the next time they had a chance. But they 
learned of the payment only after they had completed their internal attribution, and 
therefore the cash did not cause an external attribution. Because they had not been 
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working for money, these subjects returned to the puzzles as much as the no-money 
subjects did." 
These experiments have been conducted i n various settings, and also with regard to 
less enjoyable activities than puzzling (Zimbardo (1969)). If applied to wage contracts, 
the argument makes clear why i t might be profitable for the firm not to have various 
incentive payments: Since these make work less enjoyable, they might ultimately re-
quire higher wages to keep the workers working i n the firm, and it might require closer 
quality control which might be costly. In short, piece-rates might destroy morale. S i m i -
larity, entry fees or fines might create extrinsic motivation and thereby undermine 
intrinsic motivation. Thus they might simply be infeasible, rendering a l l the argu-
ments against efficiency wage theories, which I have discussed earlier, redundant. 1 8* 
I conjecture that the use of psychological arguments might be a promising direction i n 
future research, but I certainly cannot prove it , and I see that the danger of ad-hockery 
is here as great as i n ut i l i ty theory, where the specification of the ut i l i ty functions is 
usually made ad hoc to suit the purpose.1 9* To avoid this, we should rely more on 
experiments, after a l l , than on pure logic and empirically doubtful "rationality as-
sumptions". 
3.3 L a b o r Re lat ions as B a s i c a l l y U n c o n s t r a i n e d E q u i l i b r i a 
Recently it has been argued by Carmichael (1985) that the custom implies involuntary 
unemployment to be possible only i f there are "art i f i c ia l " constraints (like minimum 
wage laws) operative, which prevent ut i l i ty taking. This assertion seems to me to be far 
off the point as far as actual labor relations are concerned.2 0* A min imum wage law 
does not preclude the firm to tighten the work norms, to use cheap tools, to charge fees 
for the parking lot etc.: There are so many measures which permit the firm to reduce 
the workers' ut i l i ty to reservation uti l i ty while gaining something from this that i t 
seems unrealistic to assume a l l these possibilities away. Further i t is a common 
observation that m i n i m u m wages are usual ly not b ind ing (wage drift) and that 
"working to the rules" is detrimental for the efficiency of many firms. A l l this suggests 
to me that both the workers and the firms have typically much latitude to change their 
decisions, and that only a few outside constraints are binding: Labor relations should 
be considered as basically unconstrained equil ibria, rather than stressing outside con-
straints. 2 1* 
This brings us back again to the question why the firm does not use this latitude, why 
it i n fact behaves as a N U T , and the answer to this question, given by practitioners, 
w i l l usually be: These measures are not undertaken because they undermine the 
morale of the work force. Thus we are thrown back to the morale models of Akerlof and 
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Solow, and, for that matter, to the original nutrit ional wage model by Stigl itz , with 
"health" replaced by "morale". 
M y case for the use of psychology is to specify more closely the interrelat ionship 
between the labor contract and morale rather than leaving labor economics open-ended 
at a point which seems to be of the utmost importance. 
Footnotes 
*) Paper prepared for the conference of the Sonderforschungsbereich 5 on "Recent Developments in 
Wage Determination", in Mannheim, 5th - 7th October, 1987. I with to thank in particular 
Richard Blundell, Gisela Kubon-Gilke, Renate Schubert, Jon Strand, Winfried Vogt and Elmar 
Wolfstetter for stimulating discussion. 
l) My discussion of the isolation principle states the issue in greater detail (Schlicht 1985a, chap 2). 
See also Schlicht (1984: 73-74). 
2> I take this definition of involuntary unemployment - namely that a worker is involuntarily 
unemployed if similar workers get an employment contract which he strictly prefers to 
unemployment - from Lome Carmichael (1985: 1213). See also George Akerlof (1984:79). 
3) I am referring here to cases where firms fix wages above the utility taking level and know that in 
advance to rule out the more obvious cases where N U T behavior might result from ignorance and 
uncertainty. 
4) The survey by Janet Yellen (1984) contains some of these arguments along with pertinent 
references. See also the recent survey of related questions by Stiglitz (1987). 
5) See also Salop (1979:121) for the proposal to accomplish the same by requiring entry fees. 
6) See also Carmichael (1985) for the proposal to accomplish the same by requiring entry fees; 
Sherwin Rosen (1985: 1159) on multi-part pricing; and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984:442) for a dis-
cussion of performance bonding which they see as insufficient, however. Carl Lundgren (1985) has 
argued that this is not quite convincing, and I have made a related observation in Schlicht 
(1985b). 
7) This has been suggested already by Weiss (1980:528) who argued that these devices are not used 
because they affect morale adversely. 
8) To avoid moral hazard on the side of the firms, the firms should not profit from fining. In case of 
money fines, these should be made payable to an outisde agency, therefore. 
9> See however, Jon Strand (1987), for an interesting discussion of this issue. 
!0) The linearity assumption is not very restrictive since (1) can always be seen as a linearization. 
ID Note that this problem occurs also if the morale models are embedded into the custom in a slightly 
less mechanical and forcible way. Let u (y, e, À) be the utility function of a worker, defined not only 
on income y and effort e but also on a justice parameter X. The perception of justice is influenced 
by some social norms on appropriate income y and effort e in relation to actual income y and 
actual effort e, and we may write X = À (y / y, e / ë). 
For given norms y and ë we may define u (y, e): U (y, e ,À (y / y, e / ê) ) and the analysis remains 
unaltered. Condition (12) implies now 
ÔU _ ÔU ÔÀ 
ôy ÔÀ 6y 
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which says that the marginal utility of income must be just offset by the marginal disutility of 
increased injustice caused by a small income change. 
Condition (13) similarily implies 
ÔU _ ÔU OA 
Ôe ÔA Ôe 
with a similar interpretation which seems to be equally strange. Further,A should assume a 
maximum at y = y and e = ê which implies OA / Ôy = 0 and ÔA / ôe = 0 at this point. In the long 
run we must have y" = y and è" = e since aspiration levels adapt to actual experience, and we 
obtain ÔU/Ôy = OandôU/Ôe = 0 just as before. 
12> Function (14) is, of course different from formula (3), but I have used a similar notation for 
simplicity. 
13) As already mentioned, Akerlofs (1982) gift exchange theory actually violates the custom in that 
the effort norm enters the utility function independently of income and effort. It is, however, by no 
means clear that Akerlofs N U T results are immune against the introduction of more refined 
contracts - a problem Akerlof himself has not considered. In the case of two groups (Akerlofs 
second example) we should choose an optimal linear wage schedule (a, b) for each of the groups 
(i=l,2) and construct a nonlinear remuneration scheme which leads, upon linearization at the 
respective optima, to these linear schedules. This might not always be possible, but the reasons 
remain unclear along with possible remedies. Note further that Akerlofs first example really 
reduces to the income effect once the reservation wage is given. (Insert Akerlofs eq. (14) into (7)). 
In his eq. (13) Akerlof assumes, however, that the utility maximizing effort equals the effort 
norm. This might be true if no incentives are given (b = 0 in (1) above) and the workers enjoy 
fulfilling the effort norm, but this cannot be assumed for b * 0, and thus Akerlofs first example 
might be vulnerable against the introduction of more refined contracts as well. 
14> The fact that the custom is so wide-spread does not imply that it is actually reasonable, and I 
would love to cite Akerlofs (1980) theory of social custom to the effect that arbitrary and 
inefficient customs might persist, but unfortunately his theory is very close to the custom I want 
to attack! 
15) The most penetrating criticism can still be found in Asch (1952, ch. 10). For a modern survey of 
motivation theory, see Hal Arkes and John Garske (1982) 
1 6 ) It is argued sometimes that criticism is illegitimate as long as no better alternative is proposed. I 
do not subscribe to this view. I still feel entitled to criticize astrology although I must confess that 
I have no better alternative to answer the questions astrology deals with. If Ronald Coase 
(1984:229) writes that "we should not abandon an old theory in favor of a new one merely because 
the old has defects but because we believe the new to be better", he seems to suggest the 
illegitimacy of merely destructive criticism, but later on he argues: "Most economists make the 
assumption that man is a rational utility maximizer. This seems to me to be both unnecessary and 
misleading . . ." since according to Coase, "man as he is" simply doesn't maximize anything if he 
behaves in one way or another. In the end, Coase himself criticizes an old theory just because it is 
unrealistic, but without offering a better alternative, and this is also what I want to do here. 
17) On the "overjustification paradigm", see Arkes/Garske (1982: 335-338), Theresa Amabile (1983: 
102-103). 
18) I have discussed this in detail in the context of the Shapiro/Stiglitz theory, see Schlicht (1986b). 
19) i.e. we come down ultimately to assert that labor contracts are chosen because people like these, 
rather than other contracts. 
2 0 ) For a more detailed criticism, see Schlicht (1987). 
2 1 ) This latitude is a basic p/erequisite for-using the "voice option" so aptly described by Hirschman 
(1979). It seems so eminently important, but incompatible with the custom. 
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